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Abstract	  
“Kindred	  Ethics”	  discusses	  the	  similar	  objections	  expressed	   in	  Aldo	  Leopold’s	  “The	  Land	  
Ethic”	   and	   Alain	   Badiou’s	   Ethics:	   An	   Essay	   on	   the	   Understanding	   of	   Evil.	   Both	   men	  
oppose	  formulaic,	  procedural	  ethics	  that	  render	  thinking	  and	  consciousness	  unnecessary.	  
Although	   the	   role	   of	   post-­‐structuralist	   theory	   in	   ecocriticism	   has	   generated	   much	  
contentious	  debate,	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  these	  two	  texts—one	  a	  pillar	  of	  environmental	  
writing	  and	   the	  other	   the	  work	  of	  a	  contemporary	  French	   theorist—demonstrates	   that	  
environmental	  writing	  and	   theory	   share	   some	   common	  ground.	  Bearing	   the	   kinship	   of	  
these	  texts	   in	  mind,	  this	  article	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  supposed	  rift	  between	  ecocriticism	  
and	  theory	  is	  a	  fabrication:	  that	   is,	  both	  the	  urgent	  drive	  to	  “theorize	  ecocriticism”	  and	  
the	   equally	   passionate	   desire	   to	   preserve	   its	   “untheorized”	   purity	   are	   founded	   upon	  
myths	  that	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  field	  overturns.	  In	  concluding,	  “Kindred	  
Ethics”	  points	  out	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  informed	  by	  post-­‐structuralist	  theory	  from	  its	  
very	   origins,	   ecocriticism	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   theory	   in	   its	   own	   right—one	   that	  
challenges	  anthropocentrism,	  scrutinizes	  setting,	  and	  utilizes	  narrative	  scholarship	  as	  an	  
important	  form	  of	  archival	  research.	  
As	   the	  2012	  Special	   Issue	  of	  The	   Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  devoted	   to	  “Ecocriticism	  at	   the	  Present	  Time”	  
(volume	  4,	  number	  2)	  and	  the	  “Special	  Forum	  on	  Ecocriticism	  and	  Theory”	  in	  the	  Autumn	  2010	  issue	  of	  
ISLE	   reiterate,	   one	   of	   the	   dominant	   ongoing	   discussions	   in	   ecocriticism	   involves	   the	   role	   of	   post-­‐
structuralist	  theory	   in	  our	  field.	   In	  his	   introduction	  to	  the	  forum,	  Anthony	  Lioi’s	  reference	  to	  theory	  as	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“the	   thing	  we	  must	   have,	   the	   thing	  we	  mustn’t	   have”	   accurately	   represents	   the	   current	   range	  of	   the	  
debate	  between	  “the	  theorists	  and	  the	  mimeticists”	  (Lioi	  754;	  Major	  and	  McMurry	  5).1	  However,	  tracing	  
the	  genealogy	  of	  this	  dispute	  back	  through	  the	  history	  of	  ecocriticism	  establishes	  a	  cycle	  of	  recurrence	  
that	  actually	  begins	  at	  the	  very	  origin	  moment	  of	  ecocritism.	  That	  is,	   if	  we	  conceptualize	  the	  history	  of	  
ecocriticism	  as	  a	  tree	  with	  concentric	  annual	  growth	  rings—like	  the	  one	  Aldo	  Leopold	  gives	  an	  account	  
of	   sawing	   through	   in	   the	   “February”	   section	   of	  A	   Sand	   County	   Almanac	   (6-­‐18)—any	   transect	   of	   that	  
history	  would	  encounter	  multiple	  rings	  representing	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  role	  of	  theory	   in	  ecocriticism	  
and	  would	  finally	  discover	  that	  this	  issue	  exists	  at	  the	  very	  pith	  of	  our	  discipline.	  
	   In	   a	   recent	   and	   memorable	   moment,	   the	   argument	   regarding	   the	   value	   or	   danger	   of	   theory	   to	  
ecocriticism	  rose	  to	  a	  fevered	  pitch	  with	  S.	  K.	  Robisch’s	  response	  to	  Simon	  C.	  Estok.	  In	  “Theorizing	  in	  a	  
Space	  of	  Ambivalent	  Openness:	  Ecocriticism	  and	  Ecophobia,”	  which	  appeared	  in	  the	  spring	  2009	  issue	  of	  
ISLE,	   Estok	   offers	   the	   theorizing	   of	   ecocriticism	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   what	   he	   regards	   as	   the	   inevitable	  
collapse	  of	  the	  discipline.	  Specifically,	  he	  argues	  that	  “ecophopia”—a	  term	  he	  defines	  as	  “an	   irrational	  
and	  groundless	  hatred	  of	  the	  natural	  world”	  (208)—should	  serve	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  ecocriticism,	  much	  like	  
misogyny	  and	  sexism	  serve	  as	  the	  core	  issues	  of	  feminist	  studies.2	   In	  his	  response	  to	  Estok,	  titled	  “The	  
Woodshed:	  A	  Response	   to	   ‘Ecocriticism	  and	  Ecophobia,’”	  Robisch	  declares	  Estok’s	  piece	   contemptible	  
from	   the	   start	   because	   it	   is	   hospitable	   towards	   theory.	   Robisch	   demonstrates	   a	   clear	   distrust	   of	   “the	  
culture	   of	   ‘theory’”—which,	   he	   argues,	   “seeks	   rank	   and	   power	   more	   than	   it	   seeks	   art	   and	   insight,”	  
“relinquishes	  thorough	  analysis	  in	  a	  quest	  for	  the	  limelight,”	  and	  “is	  the	  Monsanto	  of	  a	  native	  grassland”	  
(698,	  699,	  703).	  Throughout	  his	  article,	  Robisch’s	  message	  to	  sympathetic	  readers	  is	  clear:	  he	  suggests	  it	  
is	  high	  time	  to	  “start	  monkey-­‐wrenching	  the	  theory	  machine”	  and	  concludes	  with	  a	  rallying	  cry	  capable	  
of	   producing	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   emotions,	   including	   amusement,	   passion,	   and	   even	   anxiety	   (700).	   After	  
describing	  his	  urge	  to	  pelt	  a	  panel	  of	  theorists	  with	  karo-­‐syrup-­‐filled	  water	  balloons,	  Robisch	  outlines	  his	  
vision	  of	  a	  militant	  ecocriticism:	  he	  writes,	  “Let’s	  go	  PETA	  on	  these	  nature	  fakers,	  these	  seated	  hikers.	  I	  
want	  an	  ELF	  of	  ecocritics.	  .	  .	  .	  ‘Theory’	  fantasizes	  itself	  victimized.	  I	  say,	  dreams	  can	  come	  true”	  (707).	  	  
	   Though	   the	   Estok-­‐Robisch	   exchange	   stands	   apart	   in	   terms	   of	   venom,	   it	   is,	   in	   fact,	   only	   a	   recent	  
iteration	   of	   an	   older	   dispute	   that	   includes	   Dana	   Philips’s	   2003	   book-­‐length	   critique	   of	   the	   ecocritical	  
failure	   to	   adequately	   address	   or	   incorporate	   the	   insights	   of	   post-­‐structuralist	   theory,	   as	   well	   as	   calls	  
from	  Glen	  Love	  (among	  others)	  to	  look	  away	  from	  theory	  and	  toward	  evolutionary	  science	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
grounding	  ecocriticism.	  Love’s	  statement	  that	  “no	  interdisciplinary	  study	  has	  more	  to	  offer	  us	  humanists	  
now	   than	   evolutionary	   theory	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   biology,	   ecology,	   the	   neurosciences,	   psychology,	  
anthropology,	  biogeography,	  linguistics,	  and	  related	  fields”	  well	  represents	  his	  persistent	  efforts	  to	  steer	  
ecocriticism	  clear	  of	   theory	   (166).	   In	   fact,	   he	  even	  defines	  ecocriticism	  as	  quintessentially	  opposed	   to	  
post-­‐structuralist	  theories,	  as	  standing	  “against	  a	  recent	  past	  dominated	  by	  opposing	  critical	  tendencies,	  
by	  which	  I	  mean	  those	  approaches	  that,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  have	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  physical	  
world”	  (5-­‐6).	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  book	  Phillips	  reacts	  to	  Love	  and	  those	  like	  him	  by	  suggesting	  that	  
the	   “curatorial	  model	   of	   literary	   scholarship”	   and	   the	   “[spurning	   of]	   literary	   theory”	   characteristic	   of	  
“first	  generation”	  ecocritics	  remains	  a	  problem	  for	   the	  field	   (ix).	  And	   in	  his	  chapter	  on	  “Art	   for	  Earth’s	  
Sake,”	   Phillips	   outlines	   his	   charges	   against	   several	   ecocritics,	   including	   Love,	   whom	   he	   sees	   as	  
dangerously	   antiquated	   (135-­‐84).	   Thus,	   the	   argument	   over	   the	   role	   of	   theory	   in	   ecocriticism	   clearly	  
predates	  Estok	  and	  Robisch.	  
	   Indeed,	   even	   Lawrence	   Buell	   cites	   the	   early	   ecocritical	   aversion	   to	   theory,	   but	   he	   also	   argues,	  
somewhat	  paradoxically,	  that	  theory	  was	  already	  being	  utilized	  by	  ecocritics	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  field.	  As	  
he	   explains	   in	   The	   Future	   of	   Environmental	   Criticism,	   many	   early	   ecocritics	   looked	   to	   nascent	  
ecocriticism	  “chiefly	  as	  a	  way	  of	  ‘rescuing’	  literature	  from	  the	  distantiations	  of	  reader	  from	  text	  and	  text	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from	  world	  that	  had	  been	  ushered	  in	  by	  the	  structuralist	  revolution	  in	  critical	  theory”	  (6).	  Coupled	  with	  
his	   statement	   that	   “most	   currents	   set	   in	   motion	   by	   early	   ecocriticism	   continue	   to	   run	   strong,”	   one	  
should	  not	  be	  surprised	  to	  encounter	  the	  recurrent	  debates	  about	  the	  role	  of	  post-­‐structuralist	  theory	  in	  
ecocritism,	  even	  up	   to	   the	   current	  day	   (17).	   Yet,	   as	  Buell	   acknowledges,	   even	   from	   its	  beginning	  as	   a	  
“self-­‐defined	  movement”	  (which	  he	  dates	  to	  roughly	  1993),	  ecocritism	  was	  not	  uniformly	  inhospitable	  to	  
literary	   theory.	   Indeed,	   several	   essays	   from	   The	   Ecocriticism	   Reader	   reveal	   that	   ecocritism,	   from	   its	  
beginning,	   was	   also	   informed	   by	   post-­‐structuralist	   theory.3	   The	   history	   of	   this	   debate,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
early	  presence	  of	  post-­‐structuralist	  theory	  in	  ecocritical	  scholarship,	  challenges	  Estok’s	  claims	  about	  the	  
dire	  need	  to	  begin	  theorizing	  ecocritism,	  and	  likewise	  calls	  into	  question	  Robisch’s	  near-­‐fanatic	  desire	  to	  
defend	   the	   purity	   of	   an	   ecocriticism	  untainted	   by	   theory:	   both	   arguments	   depend	  upon	   a	  misleading	  
conception	   of	   ecocritics	   as	   uniformly	   opposed	   to	   theory,	   and	   of	   ecocritism	   as	  wholly	   untheorized.	   As	  
provocative,	   interesting,	  and	  entertaining	  as	  their	  polarized	  polemics	  might	  be,	  they	  are	  both	  founded	  
on	   a	   reductive	   construction	   that	   fails	   to	   consider	   the	  multivalent	   nature	   of	   current	   (as	   well	   as	   past)	  
environmental	  criticism.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  reaffirm	  the	  ecocritical	  willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  post-­‐structuralist	  theory—as	  well	  as	  to	  
help	  move	  us	  beyond	   the	  clichéd	  paradigm	  which	  advocates	   for	  one	  of	   the	   two	  extreme	  positions	  on	  
theory—I	   wish	   to	   position	   myself	   somewhere	   on	   the	   middle	   ground	   between	   the	   polar	   ends	   of	   the	  
spectrum	  as	  represented	  by	  Estok	  and	  Robisch.	  Rather	  than	  situating	  theory	  in	  “a	  Space	  of	  Ambivalent	  
Openness”	  or	  taking	  theorists	  behind	  “The	  Woodshed”	  for	  a	  dose	  of	  discipline	  from	  the	  belt	  of	  praxis,	  I	  
will	  examine	  one	  point	  where	  existing	  theory	  intersects	  usefully	  with	  a	  canonical	  work	  of	  environmental	  
literature.	   I	  will	   juxtapose	  Aldo	   Leopold’s	   “The	   Land	  Ethic”	   and	  Alain	  Badiou’s	  Ethics:	  An	  Essay	  on	   the	  
Understanding	  of	  Evil	   in	  order	   to	  discern	  what	   the	  continued	  synthesis	  of	  environmental	  criticism	  and	  
theory	  might	  yield.4	  	  	  
	   Though	   Leopold’s	   “Land	   Ethic”	   has	   recently	   come	   under	   attack	   for	   the	   ways	   it	   espouses	   dated	  
ecological	   concepts,	   such	   presentist	  molestations	   unfairly	   dismiss	   his	   work:	   even	   if	   the	   language	   and	  
scientific	   terminology	   of	   A	   Sand	   County	   Almanac	   have,	   in	   some	   cases,	   expired,	   the	   volume	   is	   not	  
therefore	  emptied	  of	  meaning.	  For	  the	  lasting	  relevance	  of	  Leopold’s	  project	  resides	  in	  his	  attention	  to	  
issues	  of	  morality.	  Though	  scientific	  understanding	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  has	  increased	  over	  the	  past	  half-­‐
century,	  we	   still	   have	   not	   lived	   up	   to	   the	   ethical	   challenge	   he	   articulates;	   because	  we	   remain	   largely	  
apathetic	  towards	  our	  ethical	  responsibility	  to	  the	  land	  (which,	  for	  Leopold,	  included	  soil,	  water,	  and	  all	  
associated	  flora	  and	  fauna),	  Sand	  County	  cannot	  be	  as	  easily	  dismissed	  as	  those	  discussing	  the	  truth	  of	  
ecology	  might	  wish.	  In	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  article	  I	  will	  situate	  A	  Sand	  County	  Almanac	   in	  its	  proper	  
historical	   milieu	   and	   present	   Leopold’s	   argument.	   This	   contextualization	   provides	   a	   convenient	  
opportunity	   to	   reveal	   that	   the	   attacks	   of	   Dana	   Phillips	   and	   Simon	   Estok,	   though	   accurate	   in	   some	  
regards,	  fail	  to	  seriously	  deflate	  Leopold’s	  work,	  and	  unexpectedly	  reinforce	  the	  current	  purchase	  of	  the	  
moral	  components	  of	  “The	  Land	  Ethic.”	  	  
	   After	   reasserting	   the	   contemporary	   value	   of	   Leopold’s	   work,	   I	   will	   turn,	   in	   the	   article’s	   second	  
section,	   to	   Alain	   Badiou	   and	   his	   Ethics:	   An	   Essay	   on	   the	   Understanding	   of	   Evil.	   Interestingly,	   though	  
Badiou’s	   writing	   is	   separated	   from	   Leopold’s	   by	   the	   Atlantic	   Ocean	   and	   nearly	   fifty	   years,	   the	   texts	  
nevertheless	   share	   a	   remarkable	   synergy.	   Just	   as	   Leopold	   refrained	   from	   outlining	   specific	   ethical	  
practices,	  Badiou	  critiques	  the	  formulaic	  ethics	  so	  prevalent	  today.	  Given	  the	  genre	  of	  the	  two	  texts—
one	  an	  environmental	  classic	  written	  by	  a	  professor	  of	  game	  management	  and	  the	  other	  a	  product	  of	  a	  
contemporary	   French	   theorist—the	   degree	   to	   which	   they	   complement	   one	   another	   is	   striking,	  
particularly	   given	   the	   supposed	   animosity	   existing	   between	   the	   two	   distinct	   groups	   of	   scholars	   who	  
either	   focus	   on	   environmental	   texts	   or	   post-­‐structuralist	   theory.	   I	   conclude	   by	   reasserting	   that	   the	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relationship	   between	   theory	   and	   ecocriticism	   is	   actually	   a	  both/and,	   and	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   kinship	  
between	  Badiou	  and	  Leopold	  provides	  an	   important	  consideration	   for	  ecocritics:	   the	  companionability	  
of	   their	   texts	   affirms	   that	   theory	   and	   environmental	   criticism	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   neither	   diametrically	  
opposed	   nor	  wholly	   symbiotic.	   Instead,	   their	   works	   reach	   an	   agreement	  which	   frustrates	   the	   activist	  
inclinations	  of	  environmentalists	  and	  ecocritics.	  
	  
The	  Moral	  Challenge	  of	  Leopold’s	  “Land	  Ethic”	  
	  
Though	  Leopold’s	  A	  Sand	  County	  Almanac	   is	  well-­‐known	  to	  many	  modern	  readers,	  few,	  it	  seems,	  have	  
properly	   considered	   the	  book’s	   bibliographic	   context.	  When	   the	  book	  was	   first	   issued	   in	   a	   paperback	  
edition	   during	   the	   environmental	   fervor	   of	   the	   late	   60s	   and	   early	   70s,	   Sand	   County	   reached	   a	   large	  
audience	   eager	   to	   read	   and	   understand	   Leopold	   as	   an	   authoritative	   scientific	   voice	   akin	   to	   Rachel	  
Carson.5	  Though	  Leopold	  was	  trained	  as	  a	  forester,	  those	  who	  regarded	  Sand	  County	  as	  a	  treatise	  from	  a	  
concerned	   scientist	  misconstrued	   his	   project—such	   readers	   pursued	   a	  mistaken	   approach	   to	   the	   text	  
which	   has	   continued	   to	   this	   day.	   Readers	   who	   encountered	   the	   book	   during	   “The	   Environmental	  
Decade”	  and	  since	  have	  often	  neglected	  to	  consider	  the	  story	  of	  the	  book’s	  publication	  history	  and	  its	  
position	   in	   Leopold’s	   larger	   corpus.	   Because	   recent	   critics—Dana	   Phillips	   and	   Simon	   Estok,	   for	  
example—have	   carried	   forward	   the	   misappropriation	   of	   Leopold’s	   final	   work,	   it	   is	   my	   intention	   to	  
establish	  the	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  focus	  of	  Leopold’s	  Sand	  County	  Almanac.	  	  
	   The	   difficulties	   Leopold	   encountered	   as	   he	   attempted	   to	   publish	  A	   Sand	   County	  Almanac	   suggest	  
that	   the	  work	   deviated	   from	   his	   earlier,	   successful	   scientific	   writings.	   As	   Curt	   D.	  Meine	   explains,	   the	  
composition	   process	   required	   Leopold	   to	   overcome	   “multiple	   rejections,	   continual	   questioning	   of	   its	  
content	  and	  style,	  and	  a	  series	  of	  difficult	  personal	  challenges”	  (706).6	  Though	  the	  “personal	  challenges”	  
Leopold	  battled	  are	  no	  doubt	  significant,	  the	  “multiple	  rejections”	  bear	  more	  directly	  on	  the	  argument	  
at	  hand.	  Why,	  after	  all,	  would	  editors	  from	  Alfred	  A.	  Knopf	  (some	  of	  whom	  had	  solicited	  the	  book)	  reject	  
two	  different	  manuscripts?	  Similarly,	  why	  would	  Macmillan	  Company	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  
Press	  also	  reject	  the	  work	  of	  a	  successful,	  respected	  author?	  For	  by	  the	  1930s	  Leopold	  had	  emerged	  “as	  
one	   of	   the	   preeminent	   leaders	   in	   wildlife	   ecology	   and	   management”	   after	   writing	   the	   field’s	   first	  
textbook	   (Game	   Management)	   and	   being	   appointed	   to	   the	   Chair	   of	   Game	   Management	   at	   the	  
University	   of	  Wisconsin,	   both	   in	   1933	   (Meine	   697-­‐98).	   And	   by	   the	   late	   1940s,	   Leopold’s	   renown	   had	  
grown	   even	   larger.	   Thus,	   even	   though	   Leopold	   persisted	   and	   received	   a	   call	   on	   April	   14,	   1948,	   from	  
Philip	  Vaudrin	  at	  Oxford	  University	  Press	   informing	  him	  that	  the	  manuscript	  had	  finally	  been	  accepted	  
for	  publication,	  his	  struggle	  should	  prompt	  critics	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  problematic	  book	  (704).7	  	  
	   When	  compared	  to	  Game	  Management	  (1933),	  Sand	  County	  stands	  out	  as	  a	  very	  different	  work.	  In	  
the	   earlier	   volume,	   Leopold	   stakes	   his	   claim	   as	   the	   foremost	   pioneer	   and	   leader	   in	   the	   new	   field	   of	  
wildlife	  ecology	  and	  management.	  While	  Leopold	  posited	  theories,	  presented	  evidence,	  and	  positioned	  
himself	   as	   a	   scientific	   authority	   in	  Game	  Management,	   the	   tone	   of	   Sand	   County	   is	   entirely	   different:	  
instead	  of	  situating	  himself	  within	  the	  scientific	  discourse	  of	  his	  day,	  Leopold	  wanted	  to	  distance	  himself	  
from	  and	  critique	  those	  who	  focused	  science	  on	  “the	  creation	  and	  exercise	  of	  power”	  and	  ignored	  “the	  
creation	  and	  exercise	  of	  wonder	  or	  respect	   for	  workmanship	   in	  nature”	   (“The	  state	  of	   the	  profession”	  
343).	   As	  Meine	   has	   argued,	   Leopold	   recognized	   the	   need	   to	  move	   outside	   his	   professional	   circle	   and	  
target	  a	  wider	  audience:	  “His	  conviction	  was	  that	  conservation	  had	  to	  rest	  on	  a	  base	  that	  included	  not	  
only	   the	   integrated	  natural	   sciences,	   but	   also	  philosophy,	   ethics,	   history,	   and	   literature”	   (Meine	  697).	  
Thus,	   Leopold	   abandoned	   the	   strictures	   of	   purely	   scientific	   prose	   and	   began	   to	   address	   a	   general	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audience	  by	  publishing	  many	  of	   the	  pieces	  eventually	  collected	   in	  Sand	  County	   in	   journals	  such	  as	  the	  
Wisconsin	  Agriculturist	  and	  Farmer	  and	  the	  Wisconsin	  Conservation	  Bulletin	   (Meine	  700).	  Julianne	  Lutz	  
Newton	  identifies	  in	  this	  turn	  a	  dramatic	  difference	  in	  authorial	  voice:	  the	  university	  science	  scholar	  has	  
become	  “an	  artist	  with	  an	  unusual	  gift	  for	  lyrical	  prose”	  (xi).	   In	  addition	  to	  a	  change	  in	  style,	  Leopold’s	  
shift	   in	   audience	  necessitated	   a	  modification	  of	   his	   purpose:	   Leopold	  understood	   that	   the	   readers	   he	  
was	  now	  targeting	  did	  not	  require	  authorial	  objectivity	  and	  rigorous	  data	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  grasp	  the	  
moral	   questions	   being	   raised.	   In	   responding	   to	   his	   audience’s	   characteristics,	   Leopold	   crafted	   Sand	  
County	  as	  a	  pathos-­‐driven	  moral	  challenge.	  
	   Critics	  who	  have	  recently	  targeted	  Leopold’s	  “Land	  Ethic”	  choose	  to	  (mis)read	  the	  essay	  as	  a	  modern	  
treatise	  on	  ecology.	  Their	  deliberate	  misprision	  allows	  them	  to	  attack	  the	  shallow	  science	  of	  a	  volume	  
primarily	  intended	  as	  a	  moral	  challenge.	  Dana	  Phillips	  introduces	  The	  Truth	  of	  Ecology	  (2003)	  by	  claiming	  
that	   Leopold’s	   “words	   understate	   the	   difficulty”	   of	   ecological	   thinking,	   and	   that	   his	   “Thinking	   Like	   a	  
Mountain”	   encourages	   us	   to	   “assume	   that	   the	   truth	   about	   nature	   is	   straightforward”	   (vii).	   Phillips	  
echoes	   Luc	   Ferry—who	   suggested	   that	   learning	   to	   think	   like	  a	  mountain	   “promises	   to	  be	  a	  bit	   tricky”	  
(Ferry	  59)—and	  points	  out	  that	  today,	  “increasing	  numbers	  of	  ecologists	  have	  realized	  that	  knowledge	  
of	  nature	  of	  the	  sort	  imagined	  by	  Leopold	  is	  impossible	  to	  acquire”	  (Phillips	  vii).	  Simon	  C.	  Estok	  takes	  an	  
equivalently	  narrow	  view	  of	  Leopold’s	  work	  when	  he	  presents	  the	  most	  familiar	  passage	  from	  “The	  Land	  
Ethic”	   in	   order	   to	   excoriate	   Leopold	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons	   (discussed	   below).	   Phillips’s	   and	   Estok’s	  
portrayal	   of	   Leopold’s	   ecology	   as	   “scientifically	   naïve,”	   simplistic,	   and	   misinformed	   suggests	   the	  
possibility	   that	   they	  have	   taken	  Sand	  County	   out	   of	   context	   (Estok	   209).	   Though	   right	   about	   the	  now	  
dated	  ecological	   thinking	   that	   grounds	   the	   text,	   they	  have	  missed	   its	   larger	  point;	   by	   focusing	  on	   the	  
volume	  as	  a	   scientific	  work,	   they	  have	  overlooked	   its	  moral	   core.	  Or	  perhaps	   they	  have	  only	   failed	   to	  
realize	   that	   in	   fact	   they	   do	   understand	   Leopold’s	   moral	   project.	   For	   Leopold	   surely	   knew	   that	   the	  
mentality	   of	   a	   mountain	   would	   be	   “tricky”	   if	   not	   “impossible	   to	   acquire”	   and	   that	   answering	   the	  
challenge	  of	  a	  land	  ethic	  would	  be	  equally	  difficult.	  	  
	   In	  explaining	  his	  concept	  of	  a	  land	  ethic,	  Leopold	  seems	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  demands	  underlying	  his	  
challenge.8	   Leopold	   argues	   that	   our	   ethical	   framework	   should	  be	   extended	   so	   as	   to	   include	   land	   as	   a	  
community	  member—simple	  enough	  to	  phrase,	  but	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  imagine,	  even	  today.	  Further,	  
one	   should	   note	   that	   Leopold	   does	   not	   view	   this	   expansion	   of	   community	   as	   an	   act	   of	   human	  
benevolence.	   Rather	   than	   granting	   the	   land	   membership	   in	   our	   community,	   a	   land	   ethic	   requires	  
humankind	  to	  recognize	  the	  equality	  of	  man	  and	  land:	  Leopold	  writes,	  “a	  land	  ethic	  changes	  the	  role	  of	  
Homo	   sapiens	   from	   conqueror	   of	   the	   land-­‐community	   to	   plain	   member	   and	   citizen	   of	   it”	   (204).	   His	  
opening	  gesture	   in	  “The	  Land	  Ethic”	  towards	  Greek	  epic	  demonstrates	  that	  he	   is	  aware	  of	  the	  way	  his	  
idea	   goes	   against	   concepts	   of	   anthropocentrism	   engrained	   in	   human	   culture	   over	   millennia.	   That	   is,	  
when	   he	   opens	   with	   a	   reference	   to	   Odysseus’s	   decision	   to	   hang	   a	   dozen	   slave	   girls	   for	  misbehaving	  
during	  his	  absence,	  Leopold	   is	  stressing	  the	  ways	  that	  “property”	  once	   included	  certain	  humans	  (201).	  
Thus,	   Leopold	  wants	   to	  cite	   the	   slow	  process	  by	  which	   the	  enslavement	  of	  other	  humans	  came	   to	  be	  
viewed	  as	  morally	  reprehensible	  as	  a	  precedent	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  valuation	  he	  wants	  to	  see	  extended	  to	  
the	  land.	  He	  understands	  that	  instituting	  such	  sweeping	  ideological	  concepts	  will	  be	  hard,	  but	  does	  not	  
refrain	   from	   further	  elaborating	  on	  what	  he	  knows	  will	  be	   the	  unpopular	   stipulations	  demanded	  by	  a	  
land	  ethic.	  
	   Leopold	  posits	   that	  once	  a	   land	  ethic	   takes	  hold,	  humanity	  will	  embrace	   land’s	  status	  as	  an	  equal,	  
move	  beyond	   land-­‐use	  practices	  determined	  by	  economic	   self-­‐interest	  and	  governmental	   stipulations,	  
and	  recognize	  our	  “individual	  responsibility”	  for	  maintaining	  the	  health	  of	  the	  land	  (221).	  Thus,	  because	  
enacting	   and	   exercising	   a	   land	   ethic	   is	   every	   individual’s	   duty,	   Leopold	   does	   not	   outline	   any	   specific	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actions	  or	  restorative	  practices.	  In	  fact,	  Leopold	  explicitly	  opposes	  a	  genuine	  land	  ethic	  to	  the	  formulaic	  
conservation	   that	   directs	   citizens	   to	   “obey	   the	   law,	   vote	   right,	   join	   some	   organizations,	   and	   practice	  
what	  conservation	  is	  profitable	  on	  [their]	  own	  land”	  (207).	  Leopold	  objects	  to	  such	  scripted	  conservation	  
because,	   as	   he	   argues,	   “in	   our	   attempt	   to	   make	   conservation	   easy,	   we	   have	   made	   it	   trivial”	   (210).	  
Similarly,	  Leopold	  critiques	  simple	  codes	  of	  conservation	  which	  prove	  “too	  easy	  to	  accomplish	  anything	  
worthwhile”	   (207).	   Even	   when	   he	   defines	   the	   rights	   and	   wrongs	   imposed	   by	   a	   land	   ethic,	   Leopold	  
remains	   deliberately	   vague:	   as	   he	   famously	   writes,	   “A	   thing	   is	   right	   when	   it	   tends	   to	   preserve	   the	  
integrity,	  stability,	  and	  beauty	  of	  the	  biotic	  community.	  It	  is	  wrong	  when	  it	  tends	  to	  do	  otherwise”	  (224-­‐
25).	   Leopold’s	   essay	   emphasizes	   tendencies,	   not	   absolutes.	   For	   example,	   when	   he	   discusses	   the	  
conservation	  he	  practices	  with	  his	  axe,	  he	  explains	  that	  he	  will	  usually	  fell	  any	  red	  birch	  that	  is	  crowding	  
a	  white	  pine.	  However,	  even	  this	   tendency	  falls	  well	  short	  of	  an	   iron-­‐clad	  rule:	   for	  “if	   the	  birch	  stands	  
south	  of	  the	  pine,	  and	  is	  taller,	  it	  will	  shade	  the	  pine’s	  leader	  in	  the	  spring,	  and	  thus	  discourage	  the	  pine	  
weevil	  from	  laying	  her	  eggs	  there”	  (70).	  Since	  “birch	  competition	  is	  a	  minor	  affliction	  compared	  with	  this	  
weevil”	   Leopold	   will	   gladly	   rule	   against	   his	   first	   impulse	   and	   the	   general	   trend	   of	   his	   November	  
conservation	   (ibid.).	   A	   Sand	   County	   Almanac	   is	   replete	   with	   further	   examples	   of	   instances	   where	  
Leopold	  explains	  the	  times	  he	  must	  carefully	  consider	  his	  course	  of	  action	  and	  cannot	  depend	  on	  a	  hard	  
and	   fast	   rule.	   Thus,	   “The	   Land	   Ethic”—that	   is,	   Leopold’s	   essay—cannot	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   coda	   for	  
environmental	   conduct	   or	   reduced	   to	   a	   twenty-­‐five	  word	   directive.	   Because	   Leopold	   understands	   an	  
ethic	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  “process”	  of	  “social	  evolution”	  and	  stresses	  that	  “nothing	  so	  important	  as	  an	  
ethic	   is	   ever	   ‘written,’”	   any	   scholar	   who	   locates	   in	   “The	   Land	   Ethic”	   Leopold’s	   ecologically-­‐informed	  
instructions	  for	  improving	  man’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  environment	  situates	  his	  or	  her	  criticism	  on	  shaky	  
ground	  (225).	  
	   Enter	   Simon	   Estok	   and	   his	   theorizing	   of	   ecocriticism	   through	   ecophobia.	   Like	   Leopold’s	   efforts	   to	  
introduce	   the	   concept	  of	  a	   land	  ethic,	   Estok’s	  project	   involves	   the	   “extension	  of	  moral	   consideration”	  
beyond	  standard,	  contemporary	  usage.	  Estok	  argues	  that	  though	  Peter	  Singer	  takes	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  
direction	  with	  his	  articulation	  of	  “speciesism,”	  “Ecocriticism	  has	  yet	  to	  formulate	  a	  vocabulary	  for	  similar	  
prejudices	  against	   the	  broader	  category	  of	  nature”	   (206).	  Thus,	   just	  as	  Leopold	  wanted	  to	  combat	  the	  
perception	  that	  the	  land	  constitutes	  an	  “other”	  which	  can	  be	  exploited,	  Estok,	  too,	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  
othering	   of	   nature	   because	   such	   differentiation	   leads	   to	   fear	   and	   malevolence.	   However,	   instead	   of	  
crediting	  Leopold	  as	  an	  influence,	  Estok	  vehemently	  denounces	  his	  work:	  after	  reducing	  Leopold’s	  work	  
to	  the	  familiar	  chorus	  quoted	  above,	  Estok	  argues	  that	  though	  Leopold’s	  language	  	  
sounds	  good,	  .	  .	  .	  it	  is	  philosophically	  ungrounded	  and	  scientifically	  naïve.	  It	  forces	  us	  to	  
rehash	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  term	  “beauty.”	  It	  suggests	  that	  biotic	  systems	  
are	   static	  when,	   in	   fact,	   they	  are	  not.	   It	   compels	  us	   to	  believe	   that	  nature	   is	   kind	  and	  
good,	   when,	   in	   fact,	   it	   is	   morally	   neutral.	   Nature	   actively	   disrupts	   the	   integrity	   and	  
stability	  of	  biotic	  communities	  all	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  this	  is	  neither	  good	  nor	  bad.	  Leopold’s	  
dictum	   forces	   us	   to	   accept	   his	   anthropocentric	   notions	   of	   good	   and	   bad	   and	   to	   foist	  
these	  notions	  of	  good	  and	  bad	  onto	  nature.	  (209)	  
Estok’s	  argument	  likely	  strikes	  anyone	  familiar	  with	  all	  of	  Leopold’s	  volume	  as	  reductive	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
ways.9	   However,	   Estok’s	   anxiety	   about	   “[rehashing]	   the	   problems	   associated	  with	   the	   term	   ‘beauty’”	  
stands	  out	  as	  the	  most	  important	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  article.	  Estok	  seems	  to	  assume	  that	  we	  have	  
already	   determined,	   conclusively,	   what	   “beauty”	   means,	   and	   that	   any	   further	   discussion	   would	   be	  
merely	   redundant—a	   waste	   of	   precious	   time	   and	   energy	   at	   a	   time	   when	   environmental	   apocalypse	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represents	  a	  perennial	  threat.	  Estok’s	  displeasure	  with	  the	  deliberation	  required	  by	  Leopold’s	  ideal	  land	  
ethic	   reveals	   that	   Estok’s	   fundamental	   objection	   grows	   out	   of	   Leopold’s	   tacit	   refusal	   to	   provide	  
streamlined	   and	   efficient	   solutions	   for	   environmental	   issues.	   As	   noted	   above,	   he	   repeatedly	   refrains	  
from	   proposing	   specific	   practices.	   Rather	   than	   prescribing	   remedies—recycle,	   plow	   along	   contours,	  
maintain	  wildlife	  corridors	  between	  disparate	  wilderness	  areas,	  etc.—Leopold	  asks	  us	  to	  think	  about	  the	  
illness	  for	  ourselves,	  to	  individually	  “rehash”	  what	  terms	  like	  integrity,	  stability,	  and	  beauty	  really	  mean	  
and	  how	  we	  might	  best	  foster	  them.	  Leopold’s	  implicit	  demand	  for	  deliberation	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  is	  
worth	  a	  closer	  look:	  in	  addition	  to	  frustrating	  Estok’s	  desire	  for	  an	  efficient	  coda	  of	  principles	  capable	  of	  
guiding	   environmental	   actions,	   Leopold’s	   work	   also	   accords	   with	   Alain	   Badiou’s	   critique	   of	   the	   way	  
contemporary	  usage	  has	  emptied	  the	  word	  ethics	  of	  all	  vigor	  and	  meaning.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Badiou—a	  
French	   theorist	  of	   the	   sort	   considered	  anathema	  by	   those	  prizing	  praxis-­‐oriented	  ecocriticism—would	  
applaud	  much	  of	  Leopold’s	  work	  on	  ethics.	  
	  
Badiou	  and	  Subjective	  Ethics	  
	  
Before	   using	   his	   work	   on	   ethics	   as	   a	   lens	   through	   which	   to	   examine	   Leopold,	   I	   will	   provide	   a	   more	  
general	  contextualization	  of	  Alain	  Badiou	  and	  his	  writings	  since,	  as	  a	  French	  theorist	  not	  named	  Foucault	  
or	  Derrida,	  he	  likely	  requires	  some	  introduction.10	  Indeed,	  Gabriel	  Riera,	  among	  others,	  has	  commented	  
on	   Badiou’s	   marginality,	   but	   does	   not	   apologize	   for	   the	   theorist’s	   limited	   renown	   (2).11	   Instead,	   he	  
asserts	   that	   the	   scarcity	   of	   scholarly	   attention	   accorded	   Badiou	   results	   from	   the	   need	   for	   an	  
interdisciplinary	   perspective	   in	   order	   to	   fully	   comprehend	   his	   novel	   philosophical	   program:	   “He	  
approaches	  philosophy	  with	  the	  recalcitrant	  rigor	  of	  a	  mathematician	  and	  the	  economy	  of	  means	  of	  a	  
modern	  poet,	  but	  also	  with	  the	  passion	  of	  a	  militant	  of	  truth”	  (1).	  Riera	  asserts,	  though,	  that	  to	  anyone	  
versed	   in	   mathematical	   set	   theory,	   continental	   philosophy,	   and	   post-­‐structuralist	   theory,	   Badiou’s	  
system	  of	  philosophy	  is	  discernible,	  consistent,	  and	  remarkably	  courageous:	  “Badiou	  responds	  to	  an	  age	  
dominated	  by	  cultural	  relativism	  and	  skepticism	  by	  positing	  the	  existence	  of	  universal	  truths”	  (4).	  Jason	  
Barker,	  by	  emphasizing	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  “scientific	   foundations”	   for	  Badiou’s	  philosophy,	  echoes	  
Riera’s	  description	  of	  Badiou’s	  theory	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  grab-­‐bag	  and	  also	  expresses	  a	  similar	  respect	  for	  the	  
theorist’s	  ultimate	  aims:	  “Badiou	  pierces	  the	  common	  sense	  of	  each	  and	  every	  one	   in	  order	  to	  reveal,	  
against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  conventional	  wisdom,	  philosophy	  as	  a	  militant	  discourse	  on	  truth”	  (8).	  Unpacking	  
Badiou,	  then,	  clearly	  depends	  on	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  truth.	  
	   Understanding	  the	  meaning	  and	   importance	  of	  several	  key	  terms	  from	  Badiou’s	  oeuvre—including	  
event,	  subject,	  fidelity,	  and	  truth—outfits	  one	  with	  the	  fundamentals	  necessary	  to	  grapple	  with	  Badiou’s	  
turn	   to	   ethics	   later	   in	   his	   career.	   According	   to	   Peter	   Hallward,	   Badiou	   divides	   the	   “sphere	   of	   human	  
action”	  into	  two	  overlapping	  realms	  (viii).	  First,	  an	  ordinary,	  objective	  realm	  where	  the	  state	  completely	  
controls	  and	  manages	  all	  knowledge.	  This	  sub-­‐sphere	  contains	  no	  truths	  and	  also	  no	  subjects,	  only	  static	  
situations.	   Hallward	   describes	   the	   second	   realm	   as	   “an	   ‘exceptional,’”	   subjective	   “realm	   of	   singular	  
innovations	  or	   truths”	   (viii).	  One	   can	  only	   enter	   this	   realm	  of	   truths	  by	   affirming	   and	  proclaiming	   the	  
veracity	  of	  a	  non-­‐verifiable	  event	  that	  announces	  itself	  by	  forming	  a	  clear	  break	  with	  and	  disruption	  of	  
the	  status	  quo.	  Events	  are	  “irreducible	  singularities”	  (Badiou	  44)—something	  greater	  in	  magnitude	  than	  
any	   situation	   or	   natural	   phenomenon,	   “a	   hazardous	   [hasardeux],	   unpredictable	   supplement”	   (67).	  
However,	   an	   event,	   as	   Hallward	   emphasizes,	   is	   not	   objectively	   provable.	   Instead,	   events	   are	  
“ontologically	   unthinkable”	   and,	   after	   they	   occur,	   quickly	   vanish	   along	   with	   all	   evidence	   (Barker	   59).	  
Thus,	   the	   event	   creates	   the	   possibility	   of	   subjectivity—that	   is,	   only	   by	   militantly	   proclaiming	   the	  
occurrence	   of	   an	   event	   (for	  which	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   any	   substantiation)	   does	   one	  move	   beyond	   the	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realm	   of	   knowledge,	   become	   a	   subject,	   and	   enter	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   truths.	   Interestingly,	   the	   truths	  
themselves	   depend	   on	   their	   subjects	   in	   order	   to	   exist:	   truths	   “persist	   only	   through	   the	   militant	  
proclamation	   of	   those	   rare	   individuals	   who	   constitute	   themselves	   as	   the	   subjects	   of	   a	   truth,	   as	   the	  
‘militants’	   of	   their	   cause”	   (Hallward	   viii).	   	   Riera	   provides	   a	   helpful	   overview	  of	   the	   interplay	   between	  
truth,	  subject,	  and	  event:	  
A	  truth	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  excessive	  irruption	  of	  an	  event	  of	  whose	  passage	  only	  a	  name	  
remains.	  A	  truth	  is	  what	  results	  from	  the	  subjective	  process	  once	  the	  name	  of	  the	  event	  
is	  put	  into	  circulation	  in	  a	  given	  situation.	  What	  must	  be	  stressed	  here	  is	  that	  the	  subject	  
does	  not	  preexist	  the	  event	  but,	  rather,	  that	  the	  event	  is	  what	  makes	  possible	  a	  process	  
of	  subjectivization.	  (4)	  
Further,	  the	  truth	  can	  only	  endure	  through	  a	  subject’s	  fidelity	  to	  the	  event,	  and	  one	  can	  only	  remain	  a	  
subject	   through	   unflinching	   fidelity.12	   Truths	   and	   subjects	   substantiate	   one	   another	   through	   the	  
sustained	  faith	  of	  the	  subject.	  
	   Badiou	  uses	  the	  Apostle	  Paul	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  subject	  who	  maintained	  fidelity	  to	  an	  event	  which	  
could	  not	  be	  objectively	  proven	  to	  have	  occurred.	  Though	  Paul	  zealously	  persecuted	  early	  Christians,	  he	  
experienced	  a	  Badiouian	  event	  on	  the	  road	  to	  Damascus,	  as	  recorded	  in	  Acts	  chapter	  nine.	  The	  blinding	  
light	   and	   divine	   voice	   that	   characterized	   the	   event	   which	   incapacitated	   Paul	   clearly	   disrupted	   his	  
situation	  and	  gave	  him	  insight	  into	  a	  truth—for	  Paul,	  the	  truth	  was	  that	  the	  resurrected	  Jesus	  Christ	  was	  
the	   Jewish	  Messiah	  and	   the	  son	  of	  God.	  Accepting	   that	   truth	  made	  Paul	  a	  subject	   and	  simultaneously	  
enabled	  that	   truth	   to	  exist	  beyond	   its	  momentary	  occurrence—Paul	  put	  “this	  singular	  occurrence	   into	  
circulation	  and	  [rendered]	  it	  into	  a	  universal	  truth”	  (Riera	  12).	  Because	  no	  one	  was	  with	  Paul	  to	  confirm	  
the	  things	  he	  experienced,	  his	  truth	  could	  only	  persist	  through	  his	  militant	  proclamation	  and	  continued	  
fidelity.	   	  Paul’s	  lifelong	  dedication	  to	  the	  Christian	  Gospel—he	  was,	  by	  all	  accounts,	  a	  zealous	  advocate	  
of	   the	   Gospel	   and	   is	   generally	   credited	   with	   writing	   thirteen	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐seven	   books	   of	   the	   New	  
Testament—Badiou	  suggests,	  confirms	  his	  fidelity.13	  
	   Fidelity,	  event,	  subject,	  and	  truth	  all	  play	  a	  part	  in	  Badiou’s	  project	  in	  Ethics;	  however,	  in	  this	  1993	  
work,	   Badiou	   also	   considers	   the	   problem	   of	   evil.	   Badiou	   writes	   in	   anxiety:	   he	   is	   concerned	   that	   the	  
understanding	  of	  the	  interplay	  between	  ethics	  and	  evil	  has	  been	  reversed.	  He	  argues	  that	  when	  properly	  
understood,	  ethics	  provides	  a	  way	  for	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  truth	  to	  discern	  Evil	  before	  it	  compromises	  his	  or	  
her	  fidelity.	  Today,	  “Evil—or	  the	  negative—is	  primary”	  (Badiou	  8).	  Because	  evil	  has	  been	  given	  a	  priori	  
status,	  ethics	  have	  become	  a	  strictly	  defensive	  reaction	  against	  an	  ever-­‐present	  evil.	  As	  Badiou	  outlines,	  
this	  inversion	  has	  dangerous	  consequences.	  
	   Badiou	  is	  clearly	  concerned	  about	  the	  way	  “ethics”	  has	  degenerated	  over	  time	  from	  its	  early	  Greek	  
signification	   of	   “the	   search	   for	   .	   .	   .	   a	   wise	   course	   of	   action”	   (1).	   He	   points	   out	   that	   the	   frequent	  
discussion	  of	  “ethics”	  in	  print	  and	  other	  media	  today	  has	  rendered	  the	  term	  obsolete.	  Recognizing	  that	  
the	  modern	  proliferation	  of	  these	  so-­‐called	  “ethics”	  replaces	  an	  individual’s	  responsibility	  for	  thought—
one’s	  duty	  to	  search—with	  a	  list	  of	  appropriate	  responses	  to	  infringements	  upon	  human	  rights,	  Badiou	  
saw	  the	  need	  to	  combat	  what	  he	  terms	  an	  “‘ethical’	  delirium”	  and	  a	  “mindless	  catechism”	  (liii).	  Barker	  
suggests	  that	  “for	  Badiou	  ethics	  has	  become	  far	  too	  thoughtless	   in	   its	  definitions	  and	  discredited	  in	  its	  
field	  of	  application,	  a	  victim	  of	  too	  many	  journalistic	  platitudes	  to	  defend	  effectively	  the	  universal	  rights	  
of	   man”	   (135).	   Unsurprisingly,	   Badiou	   objects	   to	   such	   illegitimate	   ethics	   because	   they	   can	   only	   be	  
remedial	  and	  are	  ultimately	  nihilistic	  in	  that	  their	  “underlying	  conviction	  is	  that	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  can	  
really	  happen	  to	  someone	  is	  death”	  (Badiou	  35).	  Rather	  than	  a	  concerted	  effort	  toward	  improvement,	  
Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  5(1)	  January	  2013	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Kindred	  Ethics	  (1-­‐14)	   	  
	  
9	  
these	  procedural	  ethics	  can	  only	  be	  used	  to	  redress	  evil	  and	  to	  stave	  off	  death—the	  formula	  cannot	  be	  
applied	  until	  some	  disturbance	  to	  the	  system	  has	  been	  detected.	  Badiou	  also	  recognizes	  that	  since	  such	  
an	   ethics	   of	   response	   requires	   a	   set	   definition	   of	   disturbance	   and	   of	   evil,	   this	   kind	   of	   ethics	   quickly	  
becomes	  a	  tool	  seized	  by	  existing	  powers	  in	  order	  to	  uphold	  the	  status	  quo;	  by	  defining	  disturbance	  and	  
evil,	   those	   in	  power	   supervise	   and	  define	   the	   “objective”	   application	  of	   ethics.	   Because	  of	   the	   state’s	  
controls,	  ethics	  cannot	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  to	  become	  a	  subject	  and	  enter	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  truths.	  
Finally,	   and	   related	   to	   its	   power-­‐preserving	   mode	   and	   blocking	   of	   subjectivization,	   procedural	   ethics	  
relegates	  humans	  to	  an	  unappealing	  role:	  “Ethics	  thus	  defines	  man	  as	  a	  victim	  .	  .	  .	  man	  is	  the	  being	  who	  
is	  capable	  of	  recognizing	  himself	  as	  a	  victim”	  (10).	  Humans	  are	  only	  needed	  to	  recognize	  the	  disruption	  
and	   carry	   out	   the	   procedure.	   In	   such	   an	   arrangement	   we	   have	   been	   reduced	   to	   middle	   managers	  
without	   any	   need—or	   right—to	   think.	   Procedural	   ethics	   demands	   that	   an	   oil	   spill	   be	   cleaned	   up.	  
Genuine	  ethics	  would	  prompt	  an	  individual	  to	  ponder	  the	  alternatives	  to	  a	  transient	  culture	  addicted	  to	  
prodigious	  amounts	  of	  fossil	  fuel.	  
	   Oil	   spills	   and	   other	   human-­‐generated	   environmental	   disasters	   are	   appropriate	   to	   invoke:	   for	  
environmentalism,	   as	   Badiou	   himself	   identifies,	   is	   no	   exception	   to	   this	   general	   tendency	   toward	   a	  
profligate	   use	   of	   the	   word	   ethics	   (24).	   Because	   environmental	   threats	   are	   often	   articulated	   using	  
apocalyptic	  rhetoric,	  concerned	  citizens	  are	  understandably	  eager	  to	  act—they	  fear	  hesitancy	  because	  if	  
they	   wait	   too	   long,	   it	   may	   be	   too	   late.	   In	   such	   a	   climate,	   the	   procedural	   ethics	   lamented	   by	   Badiou	  
flourish	   because	   they	   give	   the	   environmental	   warrior	   things	   to	   do	   and	   battles	   to	   fight—no	   thinking	  
required.	  However,	  because	  one	  can	  only	  utilize	  procedural	  ethics	  after	   identifying	  a	  problem,	  Badiou	  
would	  argue	   that	  environmental	  ethics	  cannot	  be	  used	   to	   improve	   the	  world.	  Thus,	  an	  environmental	  
ethics	   based	   on	   remediation	   eliminates	   the	   possibility	   of	   stewardship	   (leaving	   something	   better	   than	  
you	  found	  it—being	  a	  caretaker	  concerned	  with	  the	  heirs	  of	  your	  garden,	  farm,	  or	  planet).	  
	   Badiou’s	  pointed	  critique	  of	  “ethics”	  as	  they	  exist	  today	  suggests	  that	  Leopold’s	  “Land	  Ethic”	  should	  
be	   celebrated	   for	   the	  way	   it	   demands	   intellectual	   labor	   from	   environmental	   activists.14	   Leopold,	   too,	  
realized	  that	  ethics	  cannot	  function	  as	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  be	  memorized	  and	  followed.	  Instead,	  he	  seems	  to	  
have	  understood	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  genuine	  ethics—the	  ethics	  Badiou	  favors,	   it	  turns	  out—is	  to	  produce	  
ethical	  people,	  subjects	  capable	  of	  deliberating	  over	  and	  deciding	  upon	  the	  best	  solution	  to	   individual	  
ethical	   dilemmas.	   Leopold’s	   land	   ethic	   also	   requires	   a	   rootedness	   in	   place.	   Because	   of	   the	   ecological	  
diversity	  within	   a	   single	  watershed,	   realizing	  what	   is	   “right”	   and	   “wrong”	   requires	   chronic	   scrutiny	   of	  
one’s	   place.	   Thus,	   even	   in	   Leopold’s	   description	   of	   a	   land	   ethic’s	   fundamental	   characteristics—which	  
Estok	   isolates	   and	   attacks—Leopold	   begs	   questions	   of	   the	   reader.	   Badiou	  would	   commend	   Estok	   for	  
asking	   these	   questions,	   but	   would	   also	   chastise	   him	   for	   complaining	   about	   Leopold	   leaving	   them	  
unanswered.	  
	  
Conclusion:	  Ecocriticism	  as	  Theory,	  Narrative	  Scholarship	  as	  Method	  
	  
Perhaps	  I	  am	  being	  too	  hard	  on	  Estok	  and	  those,	  like	  him,	  who	  favor	  a	  fully	  theorized	  ecocriticism.	  Estok	  
does,	   with	   a	   touch	   of	   sarcasm,	   point	   to	   activism	   as	   environmental	   criticism’s	   greatest	   strength:	   he	  
writes,	  “It	  is	  the	  activist	  ambitions	  that	  have	  differentiated	  us	  and	  what	  we	  seek	  to	  do	  from	  the	  legions	  
of	  staid	  thematists	  who	  muse	  uselessly	  as	  the	  world	  smolders	  to	  an	  end”	  (205).	  However,	  his	  appraisal	  
of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  environmental	  criticism	  and	  his	  attempt	  to	  propel	  our	  discipline	  towards	  theory	  
suggests	   that	   he	   has	   not	   adequately	   considered	   the	   complicated	   relationship	   between	   activism	   and	  
theory.	   Any	   grand	   plan	   for	   symbiotically	   conjoining	   theory	   and	   praxis	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   multitude	  
would,	   after	   all,	   surely	   sacrifice	   something	   important—either	   by	   abridging	   theory	   or	   by	   offering	   a	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superficial	  and	  strictly	   remedial	  activism.	  Due	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  such	  hybridization,	   I	  have	  approached	  
theory	  and	  praxis-­‐motivated	  ecocriticism	  not	  as	  waterways	   that	  must	  be	  ditched	  and	  diked	  until	   they	  
are	   violently	   combined,	   but	   as	   different	   channels	   within	   a	   braided	   river	   full	   of	   intersections.	   In	   this	  
article	   I	   have	   examined	   the	   point	   (or	   perhaps	   the	   plane)	   where	   Leopold’s	   work	   on	   encouraging	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  land	  ethic	  meets	  Badiou’s	  Ethics.	  My	  attention	  to	  this	  juncture	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  
the	   synergy	   between	   the	  works	   of	   Badiou	   and	   Leopold	   challenges	   those	  who	   assume	   an	   injection	   of	  
theory	  will	   inspire	  environmental	   activism.	   Such	   critics	  proceed	  under	   the	  assumption	   that	   theory,	  by	  
engendering	  the	  reflexivity	  necessary	  to	  recognize	  the	  constructedness	  of	  meaning,	  will	   resolve	  murky	  
arguments	   and	   illuminate	   the	   path	   forward.	   In	   fact,	   Leopold’s	   concept	   of	   a	   land	   ethic,	   though	  
unappealing	   to	   aggressive	   pro-­‐theorists,	   actually	   harmonizes	   quite	   well	   with	   Badiou’s	   Essay,	   and	   the	  
work	   of	   both	   men	   seriously	   hampers	   almost	   all	   of	   what	   passes	   for	   environmental	   activism	   today.	  
Indeed,	   Badiou’s	   work	   suggests	   that	   unless	   environmentalists	   are	   willing	   to	   assume	   the	   role	   of	  
automatons	   relegated	   to	   the	   remedial	   labor	   which	   ultimately	   bolsters	   the	   existing	   power	   structure,	  
Leopold’s	   “Land	  Ethic”	   remains	  valuable.	  Thus,	  we	  should	  be	  careful	  not	   to	  cast	   the	  deliberate	  pacing	  
required	   by	   Badiou	   and	   Leopold	   in	   a	   negative	   light.	   Working	   cautiously	   is	   important:	   regardless	   of	  
velocity,	  progress	  is	  not	  progress	  if	  it	  is	  movement	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  extract	  from	  
theory	   a	   set	   of	   environmental	   dictums	   applicable	   to	   the	   masses	   is	   likely	   a	   wrong	   direction.	   The	  
maintenance	   of	   an	   entirely	   anti-­‐theory	   mindset	   and	   approach	   to	   ecocriticism	   is,	   in	   all	   likelihood,	  
similarly	  incorrect.	  Neither	  approach	  provides	  a	  vision	  for	  a	  viable	  future	  for	  environmental	  criticism.	  	  	  
	   Fortunately,	   there	   are	   other	   alternatives,	   and	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   one	   such	   possibility—a	   rather	  
different	   “program”	   for	  maintaining	  a	   vigorous	  ecocriticism.	  Critics	  positioned	  at	   the	  extreme	  ends	  of	  
the	   issue	  advocate	  a	   top-­‐down	  organization	  which	  often	   tellingly	   locates	   its	   apex	   in	   their	   scholarship.	  
They	   therefore	   neglect	   the	   power	   of	   a	   grassroots	  model	   that	   embraces	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   approaches.	  
Rather	  than	  requiring	  a	  choreographed	  and	  synchronized	  consensus,	  why	  not	  allow	  a	  mass	  of	  ecocritics	  
to	  follow	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  instincts—to	  maintain	  fidelity	  to	  their	  own	  personal	  truths?	  As	  Badiou	  
points	  out,	  three	  prominent	  theorists—Foucault,	  Althusser,	  and	  Lacan—fused	  theory	  and	  praxis	  in	  their	  
lives:	   in	   addition	   to	   their	   publications,	   they	   were	   each	   “the	   attentive	   and	   courageous	   militants	   of	   a	  
cause”	  (6).	   	  Such	  an	  undesigned	  design	  would	  produce	  a	  flexible	  ecocritism	  composed	  of	  thinkers	  who	  
answer	   the	   question	   of	   theorizing	   ecocriticism	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways.	   It	   would	   certainly	   be	   capable	   of	  
embracing	  the	  work	  of	  those	  who,	  like	  me,	  are	  concentrating	  on	  the	  individual	  crossroads	  of	  theory	  and	  
ecocriticism,	   and	   could	   also	   sustain	   the	  work	  of	   those	  with	   a	  more	  polarizing	  opinion.	   Such	   a	   diverse	  
ecocriticism	  would	  have	  room	  for	  Estok	  and	  Robisch,	  Dana	  Phillips	  and	  Glen	  Love.	  By	  providing	  a	  variety	  
of	  options,	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  find	  a	  path—or,	  more	  likely,	  many	  paths—forward.	  
	   Further,	  while	   I	  want	   to	   resist	   any	   diametrical	   opposition	  between	   theory	   and	   ecocriticism,	   I	   also	  
want	   to	   argue,	   along	   with	   Jim	  Warren,	   that	   ecocriticism	   is	   “a	   theoretical	   approach	   in	   its	   own	   right”	  
(771).	   That	   is,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   ecocriticism-­‐versus-­‐theory	   paradigm—of	   which	   many	   ecocritics	   are	  
likely	  growing	  weary—I	  want	   to	  conclude	  by	  outlining	  an	  understanding	  of	  ecocriticism-­‐as-­‐theory.	  For	  
one	  of	  the	  ways	  to	  step	  out	  of	  the	  familiar	  rut	  that	  opposes	  theory	  and	  ecocriticism	  is	  to	  conceptualize	  
ecocriticism	  as	  not	  only	  informed	  by	  post-­‐structuralist	  theory	  from	  its	  very	  origins,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  theory	  
in	  its	  own	  right—one	  that	  privileges	  an	  ecocentric	  point	  of	  view	  and	  pays	  closer	  attention	  to	  setting	  than	  
other	  critical	  approaches.	  Also,	   in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  close	  reading	   identifies	  the	  methodology	  of	  New	  
Criticism,	  narrative	  scholarship	  exists	  as	  a	  specific	  approach	  to	  literature	  adopted	  and	  implemented	  by	  
ecocritics.	   In	   short,	   narrative	   scholarship	   functions	   as	   an	   ecocritical	   methodology	   that	   offers	   insights	  
particularly	  useful	  to	  a	  discipline	  focused	  on	  place-­‐based	  literature.	  Of	  course,	  narrative	  scholarship	  is	  no	  
monolithic	   entity:	   ecocritic-­‐practitioners	   each	   offer	   their	   own	   specific	   definitions	   and,	   occasionally,	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terminology.	  Scott	  Slovic	  urged	  ecocritics	   to	  “tell	   stories,”	  “use	  narrative	  as	  a	  constant	  or	   intermittent	  
strategy	   for	   literary	  analysis,”	  and	   to	  “encounter	   the	  world	  and	   literature	   together,	   then	   report	  about	  
the	  conjunctions”	   (28).15	   In	  Story	  Line	   (1998),	   Ian	  Marshall	   cited	  Slovic,	  and	  described	  his	  approach	  as	  
“literary	  criticism	  enlivened	  with	  stories,”	  a	  means	  of	  using	  our	   lives	  “as	  equipment	   for	  understanding	  
literature,”	  and	  as	  a	  way	  to	  generate	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  “foot	  notes”	  (7,	  8,	  147).	  Finally,	  John	  Tallmagde,	  
in	  “Towards	  a	  Natural	  History	  of	  Reading”	  asked	  critics	  of	  environmental	   literature	  to	  enact	  a	  program	  
which	  engaged	  in	  erudition	  followed	  by	  engagement	   in	  the	  form	  of	  “disciplined	  subjectivity”	  similar	  to	  
that	  practiced	  by	  Natural	  Historians	  (36).	  However,	  when	  the	  work	  of	  these	  critics	  is	  viewed	  together,	  an	  
important	   consensus	   emerges:	   narrative	   scholarship	   functions	   as	   an	   additive	   approach	   to	   literary	  
criticism	  in	  which	  the	  critic	  consults	  the	  land	  as	  an	  archive	   in	  an	  effort	  to	  gain	  insights	  into	  an	  author’s	  
text	   or	   life.	  Narrative	   scholarship	   is	   additive	   in	   that	   it	   should	   not	   take	   the	   place	   of	   any	   other	   type	   of	  
erudition.	   Publication	   history,	   historical	   and	   biographical	   context,	   etc.	   all	   remain	   essential.	   Narrative	  
scholarship	  merely	  adds	  an	  additional	  source	  of	  information:	  the	  land	  itself.	  	  
	   Of	  course,	  narrative	  scholarship	  offers	  no	  guarantee	  of	   insight.	   In	   fact,	  as	  Michael	  P.	  Cohen	  points	  
out	  in	  “Blues	  in	  the	  Green:	  Ecocriticism	  under	  Critique”—and	  as	  Tallmadge	  anticipated	  in	  his	  article	  from	  
several	  years	  earlier16—narrative	  scholarship	  offers	  several	  temptations	  that	  ecocritics	  have	  occasionally	  
found	   too	   enticing	   to	   resist.	   Cohen	   singles	   out	   John	   Elder	   in	   particular	   for	   reproach,	   some	  would	   say	  
unfairly,	  citing	  the	  latter’s	  Reading	  the	  Mountains	  of	  Home	  (1998)	  as	  an	  example	  of	  narrative	  scholarship	  
that	  in	  Cohen’s	  view	  has	  degenerated	  into	  an	  example	  of	  “praise-­‐song	  school”	  ecocritism	  that	  functions	  
more	   as	   “clichéd”	   “travelogue”	   and	   “sermonizing”	   “testimonial”	   than	   as	   rigorous	   scholarship	   (21-­‐22).	  
Cohen’s	   critique	   applies	  with	   equal	   force	   to	   applications	   of	   narrative	   scholarship	   in	  which	   the	   author	  
appears	  compelled	  to	  mention	  that	  he	  or	  she	  visited	  the	  places	  discussed.	  To	  avoid	  this	  kind	  of	  checklist	  
scholarship—this	   kind	   of	   formulaic	   methodology—critics	   should	   recognize	   that	   narrative	   scholarship	  
should	   not	   appear	   in	   published	   work	   unless	   it	   performs	   some	   service.	   Like	   other	   forms	   of	   archival	  
research,	  narrative	  scholarship	  may	  not	  necessarily	  yield	  publishable	  findings.	  
	   As	  John	  Tallmadge	  noted,	  “any	  method	  can	  be	  abused,	  and	  someone	  will	  always	  make	  a	  career	  out	  
of	  doing	  so”	  (43).	  However,	  a	   lack	  of	  discretion	  on	  the	  part	  of	  an	  individual	  critic	  should	  not	  invalidate	  
the	  methodology.	  Narrative	   scholarship	  offers	   the	  potential	   for	  novel	   insights,	  but	  never	  a	  guarantee.	  
Narrative	  scholarship	  also	  has	  a	  special	  relationship	  with	  ecocriticism.	  Because	  we	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  
setting	  than	  other	  critics,	  we	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  check	  a	  text	  against	  the	  place	  it	  references,	  keeping	  
in	   mind,	   of	   course,	   that	   no	   environment	   is	   static.	   Narrative	   scholarship	   places	   texts	   within	   their	  
geographic	   context.	   Just	   as	   New	   Historicism	   has	   emphasized	   the	   need	   to	   guard	   against	   reading	  
ahistorically,	  narrative	  scholarship	  provides	  a	  check	  against	  “ageographic”	  or	  “atopographic”	  reading.	  To	  
paraphrase	  Fredric	   Jameson’s	   famous	   imperative—“Always	  Historicize!”	   (ix)—ecocritics	   should	  make	  a	  
habit	  of	  consulting	  the	  land	  as	  an	  archive.	  In	  short,	  “Always	  Geographize!”	  	  
	   Though	  he	  is	  an	  environmental	  historian	  rather	  than	  an	  ecocritic,	  Brian	  Donahue	  demonstrates	  the	  
value	  of	  narrative	  scholarship.	  In	  The	  Great	  Meadow,	  he	  explains	  that	  his	  observations	  of	  the	  land	  and	  
his	   work	   as	   a	   farmer	   led	   him	   to	   rethink	   the	   standard	   story	   about	   why	   agriculture	   failed	   in	  
Massachusetts:	   “I	   didn’t	   want	   to	   hear	   again	   the	   timeworn	   New	   England	   tale	   of	   rocky	   hill	   farms	  
succumbing	  to	  hard	  economic	  reality	  because	  as	  an	  ambitious	  young	  farmer	  I	  wasn’t	  buying	  it—the	  land	  
seemed	   kindly	   and	   responsive	   to	  me”	   (xiii).	   Because	   the	   land	  was	   answering	   his	   agricultural	   effort—
because,	   that	   is,	   this	   archive	  was	   saying	   something	  other	   than	  he	  had	  been	   led	   to	  believe	   it	  would—
Donahue	   recognized	   that	   his	   “career	   as	   a	   practicing	   farmer	   .	   .	   .	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   another	   kind	   of	  
scholarship,”	  and	  found	  himself	  revising	  the	  standard	  story	  of	  Concord’s	  and	  New	  England’s	  agricultural	  
history	   (xvii).	   Thus,	   when	   properly	   utilized	   narrative	   scholarship	   complements	   the	   post-­‐structuralist	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mindset:	  because	  Donahue	  pairs	  skepticism	  towards	  the	  “just-­‐so	  stories”	  of	  agriculture	  in	  Massachusetts	  
with	  a	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  particularities,	  he	  comes	  to	  recognize	  the	  way	  discourse	  
has	   (falsely)	   constructed	   history.	   His	   scholarship,	   then,	   results	   from	   a	   seamless	   (perhaps	   even	  
unconscious)	   integration	  of	  theory	  and	  narrative	  scholarship;	   in	  short,	  his	  work	  models	  the	  practice	  of	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  an	  article	  appearing	  in	  that	  Special	  Issue	  of	  JoE,	  Nicole	  Seymour	  falls	  into	  line	  with	  Lioi.	  She	  differentiates	  the	  
contemporary	  strains	  of	  poststructuralist	  ecocriticism	  and	  queer	  ecology	  from	  “classic”	  ecocriticism,	  and	  even	  
suggests	  that	  the	  former	  represents	  a	  clear	  “break”	  with	  the	  latter	  (57).	  Interestingly,	  Seymour	  identifies	  David	  
Mazel’s	  American	  Literary	  Environmentalism	  (2000)	  as	  one	  signifier	  of	  this	  break,	  but	  fails	  to	  note	  that	  the	  germ	  of	  
Mazel’s	  book	  was	  collected	  in	  Glotfelty’s	  Ecocriticism	  Reader	  (1996)	  after	  being	  published	  several	  years	  earlier.	  As	  I	  
discuss	  in	  detail	  below,	  arguing	  that	  ecocriticism	  progressed	  from	  a	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  theory	  into	  a	  
contemporary	  acceptance	  ignores	  certain	  historical	  realities.	  
2	  Here	  Estok	  appears	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  Cheryll	  Glotfelty’s	  introduction	  to	  The	  Ecocriticism	  Reader,	  in	  which	  she	  
compares	  ecocriticism	  to	  feminist	  criticism:	  “Just	  as	  feminist	  criticism	  examines	  language	  and	  literature	  from	  a	  
gender-­‐conscious	  perspective	  .	  .	  .	  ecocriticism	  takes	  an	  earth-­‐centered	  approach	  to	  literary	  studies”	  (xviii).	  	  
3	  See	  SueEllen	  Campbell’s	  “The	  Land	  and	  Language	  of	  Desire:	  Where	  Deep	  Ecology	  and	  Post-­‐Structuralism	  Meet”	  
(124-­‐36),	  Michael	  J.	  McDowell’s	  “The	  Bakhtinian	  Road	  to	  Ecological	  Insight”	  (371-­‐92),	  David	  Mazel’s	  “American	  
Literary	  Environmentalism”	  (137-­‐45),	  and	  Christopher	  Manes’s	  “Nature	  and	  Silence”	  (15-­‐29).	  Campbell’s	  piece	  
seems	  particularly	  worth	  emphasizing	  for	  the	  way	  she	  outlines	  some	  shared	  tendencies	  between	  deep	  ecology	  and	  
post-­‐structuralist	  theory:	  both	  methods	  share	  “a	  critical	  stance,”	  “begin	  by	  criticizing	  the	  dominant	  structures	  of	  
Western	  culture	  and	  the	  vast	  abuses	  they	  have	  spawned,”	  stand	  “opposed	  to	  tradition,”	  question	  “the	  concepts	  on	  
which	  hierarchies	  are	  built”	  (anthropocentrism	  and	  traditional	  dichotomies,	  respectively),	  and	  “criticize	  the	  
traditional	  sense	  of	  a	  separate,	  independent,	  authoritative	  center	  of	  value	  or	  meaning;	  both	  substitute	  the	  idea	  of	  
networks”	  (127-­‐28,	  131).	  McDowell’s,	  Mazel’s,	  and	  Manes’s	  essays	  are	  also	  noteworthy	  for	  the	  ways	  they	  apply	  the	  
post-­‐structuralist	  insights	  of	  Bakhtin,	  Foucault	  and	  Said,	  and	  Foucault,	  respectively.	  
4	  Badiou’s	  text	  was	  first	  published	  as	  L’éthique:	  Essai	  sur	  la	  conscience	  du	  Mal	  in	  1993.	  I	  take	  my	  text	  from	  Peter	  
Hallward’s	  2001	  translation.	  	  
5	  Oxford	  UP	  released	  a	  paperback	  edition	  in	  1968.	  In	  1970	  Sierra	  Club/Ballentine	  books	  released	  an	  enlarged	  
paperback	  edition	  and	  the	  book	  became	  a	  surprise	  bestseller.	  
6	  The	  personal	  challenges	  included	  Leopold’s	  struggle	  with	  “the	  painful	  facial	  spasms	  associated	  with	  trigeminal	  
neuralgia	  (or	  tic	  douloureux)”	  and	  the	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  studentry	  brought	  about	  by	  World	  War	  II	  (Meine	  704).	  
7	  However,	  Leopold	  would	  not	  oversee	  the	  final	  changes	  made	  to	  his	  manuscript;	  that	  responsibility	  fell	  to	  his	  son	  
Luna	  (along	  with	  Joe	  Hickey	  and	  Frances	  and	  Frederick	  Hamerstrom)	  after	  Leopold	  died	  from	  a	  heart	  attack	  while	  
fighting	  a	  fire	  on	  a	  neighbor’s	  property	  just	  one	  week	  after	  	  receiving	  the	  good	  news.	  The	  book	  was	  published	  in	  
the	  fall	  of	  1949	  as	  A	  Sand	  County	  Almanac,	  and	  Sketches	  Here	  and	  There.	  The	  title	  was	  one	  of	  the	  changes	  Luna	  
agreed	  to	  make	  to	  his	  father’s	  manuscript.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  Aldo’s	  death,	  the	  book	  was	  titled	  Great	  Possessions.	  
However,	  editors	  at	  Oxford	  found	  that	  title	  “too	  Dickensian”	  (Meine	  705).	  Aldo	  had	  also	  used	  “Marshland	  Elegy—
And	  Other	  Essays”	  and	  “Thinking	  Like	  a	  Mountain—And	  Other	  Essays”	  as	  earlier	  titles	  for	  his	  manuscript.	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8	  References	  to	  the	  published	  essay	  use	  quotation	  marks	  (“The	  Land	  Ethic”	  or	  “Land	  Ethic”).	  Because	  it	  is	  my	  
contention	  that	  Leopold	  did	  not	  view	  his	  essay	  as	  an	  actual	  land	  ethic	  but	  only	  wished	  to	  discuss	  what	  one	  would	  
look	  like	  when	  it	  arrived,	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  concept	  Leopold	  described	  as	  “a	  land	  ethic”	  rather	  than	  “Leopold’s	  land	  
ethic.”	  
9	  Grounds	  for	  objecting	  to	  Estok’s	  reading	  of	  Leopold	  are	  many.	  First,	  any	  treatment	  of	  Leopold’s	  
“anthropocentrism”	  needs	  to	  account	  for	  the	  ecocentrism	  present	  in	  “Thinking	  Like	  a	  Mountain.”	  Also,	  his	  
description	  of	  riding	  horseback	  on	  White	  Mountain	  during	  a	  lightning	  storm	  makes	  clear	  his	  understanding	  that	  
nature	  is	  not	  kind	  and	  good:	  “The	  explosions	  are	  fearsome	  enough,	  but	  more	  so	  .	  .	  .	  are	  the	  splinters	  that	  fly	  when	  
a	  bolt	  explodes	  a	  pine.	  I	  remember	  one	  gleaming	  one,	  15	  feet	  long,	  that	  stabbed	  deep	  into	  the	  earth	  at	  my	  feet	  
and	  stood	  there	  humming	  like	  a	  tuning	  fork”	  (126).	  Again,	  given	  the	  audience	  Leopold	  envisioned	  for	  Sand	  County,	  
labeling	  the	  work	  as	  “scientifically	  naïve”	  is	  simply	  unfair.	  Finally,	  “stability”	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  concrete	  a	  term	  as	  
Estok	  makes	  it	  out	  to	  be.	  As	  a	  student	  of	  Clementsian	  succession	  (see	  Newton,	  184-­‐91),	  Leopold	  was	  not	  using	  
“stability”	  as	  a	  stand	  in	  for	  “static”:	  rather,	  he	  understood	  that	  ecosystems	  change,	  but,	  even	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  
change,	  maintain	  a	  homeostasis	  quite	  different	  from	  a	  human-­‐imposed	  monoculture.	  
10	  Because	  I	  discuss	  only	  one	  of	  Badiou’s	  works—his	  Ethics:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Understanding	  of	  Evil—in	  much	  detail	  
and	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  advance	  any	  new	  argument	  about	  his	  theory,	  I	  have	  found	  it	  convenient	  to	  utilize	  scholarship	  
from	  critics	  who	  specialize	  in	  Badiou’s	  work.	  I	  have	  found	  the	  works	  of	  Barker,	  Riera,	  and	  Hallward	  (both	  his	  
introduction	  to	  Ethics	  and	  his	  Badiou:	  A	  Subject	  to	  Truth)	  especially	  useful.	  Though	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  primary	  and	  
secondary	  sources	  on	  Badiou	  that	  this	  article	  considers	  is	  limited,	  I	  have,	  whenever	  possible,	  presented	  what	  I	  take	  
to	  be	  the	  consensus	  view	  of	  Badiou’s	  theory,	  or	  emphasized	  points	  of	  contention	  and	  my	  own	  readings.	  
11	  Riera	  suggests	  that	  Badiou’s	  marginality	  is	  a	  result	  of	  “his	  public	  image	  as	  a	  militant	  philosopher	  who	  still	  
believes	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  forms	  of	  the	  collective	  that	  defy	  neoliberal	  logic”	  and	  of	  his	  extensive	  use	  of	  
mathematical	  set	  theory	  (2).	  Riera’s	  conception	  of	  Badiou	  as	  a	  liminal	  figure	  is	  not,	  however,	  uniformly	  accepted.	  
In	  fact,	  Hallward	  suggests	  that	  Badiou	  is	  rivaled	  only	  by	  Deleuze	  and	  Derrida	  as	  the	  most	  important	  contemporary	  
French	  philosopher	  (viii)	  and	  Barker	  labels	  him	  “the	  most	  ambitious	  speculative	  thinker	  since	  Hegel”	  (1).	  
12	  For	  Badiou,	  one’s	  fidelity	  to	  a	  truth	  can	  fail	  in	  three	  ways:	  delusion,	  betrayal,	  and	  disaster.	  That	  is,	  one	  might	  
confuse	  an	  event’s	  simulacrum	  with	  the	  real	  event,	  abandon	  the	  truth,	  or	  identify	  the	  truth	  with	  a	  total	  power.	  See	  
Ethics	  71-­‐87.	  
13	  For	  more	  of	  Badiou’s	  discussion	  of	  Paul	  and	  his	  writings,	  see	  his	  Saint	  Paul.	  La	  fondation	  de	  l’universalisme	  
(1997),	  Ethics	  123-­‐25,	  and	  Bell’s	  article.	  
14Obviously	  Badiou	  would	  not	  applaud	  Leopold’s	  decision	  to	  develop	  a	  Land	  Ethic.	  For	  Badiou,	  there	  are	  no	  
specialized	  ethics;	  there	  is	  only	  one	  universal	  ethics.	  	  
15	  Although	  I	  quote	  from	  Slovic’s	  2008	  Going	  Away	  to	  Think,	  I	  list	  him	  first	  because	  his	  call	  for	  narrative	  scholarship	  
dates	  to	  “Ecocriticism:	  Storytelling,	  Values,	  Communication,	  Contact,”	  a	  paper	  delivered	  at	  the	  1994	  meeting	  of	  the	  
Western	  Literature	  Association.	  
16	  Tallmadge	  lists	  several	  potential	  “objections”	  to	  narrative	  scholarship,	  or,	  to	  use	  his	  terminology,	  “a	  natural	  
history	  of	  reading”:	  “that	  such	  criticism	  is	  mere	  self-­‐indulgence;	  that	  the	  critic,	  by	  engaging	  in	  narrative,	  presumes	  
to	  supersede	  the	  artist	  and	  blur	  the	  line	  between	  literature	  and	  criticism;	  that	  by	  endeavoring	  to	  speak	  for	  nature	  
the	  critic	  is	  merely	  perpetuating	  the	  scandal	  of	  human	  domination;	  that	  engagement	  is	  just	  an	  excuse	  to	  avoid	  real,	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